In comparing an immediate life annuity with a payout-equivalent investment fund payout plan (self-annuitization), research to date has focused mainly on shortfall probabilities of self-annuitization. As an exception, Schmeiser and Post (2005) propose a family strategy where the chances of self-annuitization (i.e., bequests) are taken into consideration as well. In such a family strategy, potential heirs must bear shortfall risks, but in return have a chance of receiving a bequest. This paper analyzes under which conditions heirs will be willing to agree to a family strategy. The idea of a family strategy is integrated into a realistically calibrated intertemporal expected utility framework, taking into account risks arising from stochastic life span, asset returns, and nontradable labor income. A family strategy is shown to be accepted for many parameter combinations, especially in families with low marginal tax rates, if the heirs are wealthy, or in a case where the retiree has an average population life expectancy. We also work out how family self-annuitization decisions interact with asset allocation, saving decisions, and labor income risk. Under realistic conditions our results support two explanations for the empirically observable low demand for annuities (the so-called annuity puzzle), namely intra-family risk sharing and high cost of market-annuitization.
Introduction
According to Yaari's (1965) seminal paper, expected utility maximizers without bequest motives should annuitize their entire wealth, given a fair life annuity market. This result was recently confirmed by Davidoff et al. (2005) under more general assumptions about utility functions. However, annuity markets are, in general, far from being perfect since only unfairly priced annuities are available due to adverse selection 1 and transaction costs (Mitchell et al. 1999; von Gaudecker and Weber 2004) . In this context, several authors propose selfannuitization strategies in order to beat the market-annuitization benchmark (e.g., Milevsky et al. 1997; Milevsky and Robinson 2000; Albrecht and Maurer 2002; Milevsky and Young 2003, 2005; Blake et al. 2003; Young 2004; Milevsky 2005; Schmeiser and Post 2005) . The self-annuitization strategies are individual payout plans-typically investment-fund based-that attempt to replicate the payout stream of a life annuity. The literature mainly focuses on the shortfall risk of self-annuitization strategies and shows that-dependent on the riskiness of the asset allocation and the annuity buyer's age-it is possible to minimize, but never fully eliminate, shortfall risk in the case of fixed-payout annuities. This means that there is always a risk of outliving one's money. 2 Schmeiser and Post (2005) argue that knowing only the probability of outliving one's money does not provide enough information for the self-versus market-annuitization decision because self-annuitization strategies bring about risks and chances. Self-annuitization strategies-in contrast with traditional life annuities-create the chance to bequeath wealth if a retiree does not outlive his money. However, a retiree in pursuit of a self-annuitization strategy would have to bear the shortfall risks, whereas the chances (i.e., bequests) are on the heirs' side (if the retiree has no utility of bequest). Schmeiser and Post (2005) propose a family strategy where heirs bear both chances and risks. The starting point of this strategy is an insurance company's offer of an immediately beginning life annuity. Instead of investing money in this annuity, the retiree is offered a second alternative. He invests the money in an investment fund and generates the same payout stream that would have been provided by the insurance company. In this family strategy, the future heirs have to bear the risk that the fund will be exhausted during the retiree's lifetime. In contrast to the market insurance alternative, however, there is still a chance to inherit a share of the money invested. The family might also save costs of adverse selection-assuming symmetric information within the family-and transaction costs-assuming
